We tell you what skepticism is, its history and characteristics. Also, its differences with dogmatism.
What is skepticism?
Skepticism is a philosophical current that opposes dogmatism and thinks that the truth cannot be known.. It is, along with Epicureanism and Stoicism, one of the most important intellectual movements of Hellenism.
Although its beginnings are attributed to Pyrrho of Elis (360-270 BC), Skeptics maintain that skepticism is not a school but an attitude. This happens because they reject all dogmas and even the idea of a teacher. Skepticism is an act of thinking, a disposition, not a doctrine.
The Pyrrhonian project believes that living without belief leads to happiness. In this it differs from academic skepticism, which maintains that it is not possible to know. The Pyrrhonians refrained from participating in epistemological discussions between dogmatists and academics.
For the skeptic, the only thing possible is to suspend judgment regarding knowledge. There are no dogmas to affirm or contradict, since nothing can be affirmed or denied with certainty. The truth does not exist.
Frequently asked questions
What is skepticism?
Skepticism is a philosophical current that thinks that the truth cannot be known.
Who was the founder of skepticism?
The founder of skepticism was Pyrrho of Elis, although skeptics think that it is not a school but an attitude.
What is Pyrrhonian skepticism?
Pyrrhonian skepticism is a form of skepticism that seeks to suspend judgment and achieve imperturbability.
History of skepticism
Skepticism was born in Antiquity, in Greece. Although it is believed that it was practiced since pre-Socratic times, the development of mature skepticism is attributed to Pyrrho of Elis.
Pyrrho was born in Elis in 360 BC. C. He studied philosophy with Brisón (5th century BC) and Anaxarco de Abdera (4th century BC). What is known about him is thanks to the testimonies of Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus and Timon of Phliunte, who was his disciple and continuer of skepticism.
It was Sextus Empiricus (160-210 BC) who carried out, in 200 BC. C., the first great synthesis of skepticism as a philosophical movement. He argued that Pyrrho, although he was not the founder of skepticism, did generate a great change, since he managed to separate the skeptical attitude from any other philosophical conception.
Simultaneously with this current, during the 3rd century BC. C., Arcesilaus and Carneades developed academic skepticism in Plato's academy. Unlike Pyrrhonian skepticism, which avoided passing judgment, this form of skepticism believed that knowledge was not possible.
In the Middle Ages, Augustine of Hippo (354-430) took up skeptical arguments to dismiss them. In the Modern Age, for their part, thinkers such as Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), David Hume (1711-1776) and René Descartes (1596-1650), assumed attitudes that today are considered skepticalresuming part of the tradition. In fact, Descartes' hyperbolic doubt is often said to be a modern form of skepticism, since the French thinker maintains that he cannot pass judgment on anything he can doubt.
The word skepticism comes from the Greek skeptikoswhich means “look,” “examine,” or “observe carefully.” The skeptics were skeptikoi“those who examine”: they were never satisfied with the explanations that were obvious.
Pyrrhonian skepticism
Pyrrhonian skepticism was defined as the ability to oppose phenomena and theoretical considerations in any way to achieve first the suspension of judgment and then imperturbability..
In general, it can be said that the Pyrrhonian skeptic takes four steps when proceeding in his philosophical activity:
- Opposition of reasons.
- Contrast of forces between opposing reasons.
- Suspension of trial.
- Imperturbability.
Although only the first and third are steps taken by the skeptic, steps two and four, as derived consequences, are part of the chain of actions in skeptical activity from the moment of facing a statement until reaching the state of imperturbability.
The skeptical research approach bases its analysis on the contrast of arguments. This contrast can occur between two or more appearances, between two or more theoretical considerations and even between appearances and theoretical considerations. Furthermore, the opposition can extend to present, past or future things, and even combinations between them. The skeptic may resort to examples from the past or future possibilities when he does not find sufficient arguments in the present to establish an adequate contrast.
Skepticism and dogmatism
Skepticism and dogmatism represent two opposing currents of thought in the search for truth.. While dogmatism defends an attitude that refuses to question its beliefs and does not offer evidence to support them, demanding absolute acceptance, skepticism, on the other hand, is based on doubt and uncertainty, constantly questioning and seeking solid evidence before accepting any affirmation.
Philosophical dogmatism upholds the capacity of human reason to know the truth, while skepticism criticizes this position, arguing that dogmatism cannot justify its basic precepts. History records that many skeptical arguments arose in response to the dogmatic arguments of ancient philosophers.
In modern times, this critical attitude was also adopted by renowned thinkers, such as David Hume, René Descartes and even Immanuel Kant, who recognized that it was Hume who shook him from his dogmatic slumber, urging him to reflect more rigorously on the bases of his knowledge. Ultimately, skepticism plays an essential role in philosophy by encouraging a more rigorous and cautious approach toward the pursuit of true knowledge..
References
- Hoyos, LE (1999). Meaning and banality of philosophical skepticism. Ideas and values, 48(109), 53-84.
- Rueda, G. Ancient philosophical skepticism.
- Alcalá, RR (2005). Ancient skepticism: Pyrrho of Elis and indifference as a therapy of philosophy. Daimon International Journal of Philosophy, (36), 33-52.
- Conche, M., & Urbano, C. (2003). Philosophical skepticism and its limit. Philosophical Discussions, 4(7), 121-127.
