Missile Crisis (1962)

We explain what the missile crisis was and their importance in the Cold War. In addition, negotiations between Jrushchov and Kennedy.

The “missile crisis” was a set of Events that generated great international tension in the context of the Cold War. It was the preparation for the war between the United States and the Soviet Union in its arms career.

When the Cuban Revolution of Fidel Castro triumphed (1959), US interests in Cuba were harmed and the US government took a series of aggressive measures to impose itself on this country. However, given this situation Castro obtained the support of the USSR to maintain its autonomy and approved the installation of Soviet missiles on the island.

In response, the US warships surrounded Cuba and the US threatened with a total invasion and the attack on any Soviet ship that will approach. However, given the danger of a direct confrontation between both superpowers, governments chose to negotiate and Avoid the development of a nuclear war of mass destruction.

The negotiations between John F. Kennedy (president of the United States) and Nikita Jrushchov (leader of the USSR) during the missile crisis generated an agreement. Consequently, The missiles were uninstalled and the American and Soviet governments began a conciliation and diplomacy policy. Thus began, a new stage of the Cold War, known as the “peaceful coexistence.”

See also: Blocks of the Cold War

The background of the missile crisis in Cuba

Cuba had been a country closely linked to US interests since its independence from Spain in 1898. Fidel Castro's revolution in 1959, which was initially defined as a communist but had a clear nationalist orientation, began to take measures that harmed US interests. Castro had started a nationalization process of companies and agrarian reform.

The United States reaction was immediate and aggressive. In 1961, the president, Dwight Eisenhower, froze Cuban assets in US banks and formally broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. Then, the Americans imposed an economic blockade, expelled Cuba from the OAS (Organization of American States) and organized an invasion of Bay of Cochinos (in southern Cuba) that failed.

In that context, the regime of Fidel Castro sought the support of the socialist oriental bloc, with the aim of strengthening relations with the USSR. In turn, the influence and continuous attempts of American intervention led him to establish increasingly rigid control over Cuban politics and societyin order to consolidate the power of the revolution and avoid the restitution of a pronorteamerican government.

Nikita Jrushchov (leader of the USSR) obtained from her alliance with Cuba an unexpected advantage. In 1961, the United States had installed a nuclear missile plant in Türkiye. In response and taking advantage of this new situation, Jrushchov negotiated with Castro and agreed the installation of medium -range missiles on the island of Cuba. When an American spy plane flew over the area and warned the government of the new facilities, the missile crisis was triggered, one of the most serious crises of the cold war.

Development of the missile crisis

In October 1962, U2 American spy airplanes detected the construction of missile ramps and the presence of Soviet troops on the island of Cuba. On October 22, with the support of his Western allies, John F. Kennedy (the new US president.) Ordered to establish what he called a “defensive quarantine.”

It was a military maneuver to block the island. Naval units and combat aircraft were deployed forming a perimeter around Cuba. Then, Kennedy threatened to attack any Soviet ship that approached the perimeter. Meanwhile, air, land and water invasion of the island was planned.

This was the moment of the cold war in which the USSR and the United States were closer to face in a direct attack. However, both powers recognized that a confrontation Direct would lead to a nuclear war and mutual destruction.

Given this situation, Jrushchov and Kennedy began secret negotiations. Finally, Kennedy agreed to remove the American missiles deployed in Türkiye and promised not to attack Cuba and respect his autonomy. In return, Jrushchov withdrew the missiles from the Cuban island.

See also: the relaxation in the cold war 1962-1975

The consequences of the missile crisis

The real danger of a nuclear war during the missile crisis led both powers to establish an agreement to distend tensions. Since then, The “Red Telephone” was established: a line of direct communication between the White House (the headquarters of the US Government) and the Kremlin (the USSR government headquarters). In this way, it was sought to improve diplomatic relations between both superpowers.

In turn, this was accompanied by a new international political orientation. After the Cuba crisis, the Cold War entered its stage known as the “peaceful coexistence.” During this period, The superpowers sought to define through diplomacy and negotiation the different conflicts that faced them.

In addition, they promoted a series of initiatives to avoid the outcome of a nuclear war and limit the growth of arms capacity.

Correspondence between Kennedy and Jrushchov about the missile crisis

Given the crisis that originated with the installation of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States had to initiate negotiations to reach an agreement and avoid the escalation of violence in the conflict. There are two iconic letters of this exchange, written on October 26 and 28, which allow the beginning of the negotiations between the two powers.

Nikita Jrushchov letter to John. F. Kennedy

October 26, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

I have known with satisfaction to Mr. Thant in the sense that measures will be taken to prevent contact between our ships and thereby avoid irremediable consequences.

This reasonable step for your part reinforces my belief that you are demonstrating concern for safeguarding peace and observing this with great satisfaction.

I have already sustained on occasion that our people, our government and I personally, as president of the Council of Ministers, are concerned only that our countries can develop and occupy a decent place among all the peoples of the world in economic competition, in the progress of culture and arts, in the increase the welfare of humanity.

This is the most noble and necessary field for competition and, both the victors and the defeated, only profits can obtain from it, since in it the peace and improvement of the living conditions of man are implicit.

In your statement you have supported that the main objective is to reach an agreement and adopt the necessary measures to prevent a clash between our ships, with the consequent accentuation of the crisis that could lead to a military conflict, after whose outbreak all conversations would be superfluous since then other forces and other laws, war laws would then enter into liza.

I agree with you. But this is only the first step, since the most important measure to adopt is the normalization and stabilization of peace between the states and among the peoples.

I take care of your concern, Mr. President, for the security of the United States, because this is the first duty of a president. But we, the Russians, are also concerned about the same issue, and I as president of the Council of Ministers assume the same obligations in relation to the USSR.

You have shown your concern about the fact that we have helped with weapons to Cuba in order to strengthen your defensive capacity -yes, precisely your “defensive capacity” -because, regardless of the weapons it possesses, Cuba cannot be compared to the United States. The amounts are very different, the military potential available to the United States and Cuba.

Our intention has been, and it is still, to help Cuba. And no one can deny the human character of our reasons, which are not others to make Cuba live in peace and that develops according to the wishes of his people.

You want to maintain your country's safety. This is understandable, but Cuba aspires to the same. All countries wish to maintain their own security.

How can we, the Soviet Union, our government, value your actions, specifically the fact that you have surrounded with military bases to the Soviet Union and our allies, establishing in them projectile arsenals? North American officials have declared countless times, and unequivocally, that their projectiles are located in Great Britain and Italy and who are pointing against us. Of course there are also projectiles located in Türkiye.

You are worried about Cuba. You say that Cuba worries you because there is a distance of only 145 kilometers from it to the American coast. Do you consider that you have the right to demand security for your country and the withdrawal of all those weapons to which it qualifies as “offensives” and does not recognize that the same right assists us?

You have installed deadly projectiles, weapons of the considered offensive for you, on the floor of Türkiye, practically next to us. How can a concordance between our fellow military capacity and the unequal relations between our two great states be admitted?

Okay, Mr. President, who has accessed our representatives to meet and initiate conversations apparently under the mediation of the Secretary General of the United Nations, or Thant. This international official has assumed the role of mediator and we consider him trained to carry out this mission of responsibility, assuming, of course, that each of the parties must demonstrate good will to solve the conflict.

I estimate that it is possible to quickly end the conflict and normalize the situation so that peoples can breathe more easily considering that responsible state men make good sense, full awareness of their responsibilities, sufficient ability to resolve complicated issues and will not let the events lead to the catastrophe of a war.

Therefore, I make this proposition to you: we access to withdraw from Cuba those materials that you described as offensives, and we can commit ourselves to it within the United Nations. In reciprocity, their representatives will make a statement in the sense that the United States, considering the difficulties and anxiety of the Soviet state, will withdraw from Türkiye similar offensive materials.

Let's reach an agreement regarding the necessary period of time, for you and for us, in order to put this plan into practice. After this, trusted persons of the United Nations Security Council may monitor the exact compliance with the commitments on the ground.

Of course, the authorization of the governments of Cuba and Türkiye will be necessary so that UN agents can enter the respective countries and carry out their inspection mission. Ideally, these agents enjoy not only the confidence of the Security Council, but of the confidence of the United States, the Soviet Union and Turkey and Cuba. I think it will not be difficult to choose those agents who must respect the interests of all affected parties.

We, committing to give satisfaction to the hopes of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their own safety, we will make a statement before the Security Council so that the Soviet government makes the solemn promise of respecting the sovereignty of Turkey and the inviolability of its borders, of not interfering in their affairs, of not invading Turkey, of not making the head of the territory of a bridge. Such an invasion and contain the intentions of all people who project an aggression against Türkiye, both from the territory of the Soviet Union and from that of other neighboring states of the Turkish nation.

The United States government will make an analogous declaration, also before the Security Council, in the sense of respecting Cuba. It will declare that the United States, driven by respect for the sovereignty of Cuba and the inviolability of its borders, undertake not to interfere with their internal affairs, not to invade Cuba, not to make the American territory a platform for such invasion and to contain the intentions of all people who project an aggression against Cuba, both from the territory of the United States and from the territory of the territory of the neighboring states of the Cuban nation.

For this we would naturally need an agreement on a time limit. Let us arrive, then, to an agreement on such a period of time, but without delaying it too much: two or three weeks, of course no more than a month.

The materials located in Cuba that you have referred to and that constitute the reason for your concern, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidental use of them with damage to the United States is excluded.

These materials are located in Cuba at the request of the Cuban government and exclusively for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba or attack against the Soviet Union or against any of its allies, these materials do not constitute or constitute a threat to anyone. Because its installation does not pursue attack purposes.

If you agree with my proposition, Mr. President, we can send our representatives to New York, the United Nations, with concrete instructions so that we can reach an agreement. If you also choose your men and give them the corresponding instructions the issue can be quickly settled.

Why do I want this? Because the whole world is currently worried and expects a rapid solution. The greatest joy for all peoples can be the announcement of our agreement on the radical liquidation of the conflict raised. I attribute great importance to this agreement, which can also be used as a good step to pave the way to an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests. The issue of evidence must be studied in parallel, although without relating one issue to the other, since they are of a different nature.

However, it is important that an agreement on the two issues to provide the people a good service is achieved, to also rejoice with the news of the interruption of nuclear tests, to show that the atmosphere will not be for longer contaminated. Our position and yours in this regard, Mr. President, are very close.

All this can also be used as a good starting point towards the achievement of other agreements on other issues about which we now exchange our views. These issues have not been able to be resolved for now, but they are waiting for an urgent solution that makes the international atmosphere clearer. We are willing to get it.

These are, then, my propositions, Mr. President. Yours, respectfully,

Nikita Jrushchov

John's letter. F. Kennedy to Nikita Jrushchov

October 28, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

I have read his October 26 letter with great care and I celebrate to know his desire to find a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is to cease in the work of the projectile facilities directed in Cuba, and use all the offensive weapons existing in Cuba, under the supervision of the United Nations.

In the belief that this will be carried out promptly, I have instructed my representatives in New York that will allow them to draw during this purpose of Sernana, in cooperation with the Secretary General of the United Nations and their representatives, an agreement for a permanent solution of the Cuban problem, following the lines suggested by you in your October 26 letter. According to how I read and understand his letter, the key elements of his proposals that seem acceptable to me in general are the following:

1. You will agree to eliminate these facilities for existing offensive weapons in Cuba, under the observation and supervision of the United Nations, and proceed, with adequate assurances, to stop the introduction of such facilities and weapons in Cuba.

2. We, for our part, will be willing – through the establishment of the adequate agreements made through the United Nations to ensure the continuity and implementation of these commitments – to the following: a) Immediately lift the quarantine measures now in force; yb) Give security against the invasion of Cuba. I trust that other nations of the Western hemisphere are willing to act in the same way.

If you give your specific representatives instructions, there is no reason why we are not able to complete these agreements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such agreement on world tension will allow us to continue working towards a general agreement regarding “other armaments” as you propose in your second letter that you have made public. I would like to point out that the United States is interested in reducing tensions and stopping the arms race. And this letter means that you are willing to discuss a truce that affects NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are willing to consider with our allies any proposal or convenient proposals.

But the first condition, it is necessary to emphasize it, is the cessation of work in the projectile launching facilities directed in Cuba and the appropriate measures to disable such projectiles, under concrete international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or the extension of this discussion regarding Cuba relating it to other issues related to European security and the world, will surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a serious effect for the peace of the world. For this reason, I hope we can agree according to what is indicated in this letter and in its letter of October 26, 1962.

John F. Kennedy

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References

• Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. (2023). “Cuban Missile Crisis”. Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/
• Martínez Rueda, F. (2006). “Correspondence between Kennedy and Kruschev about the missile crisis (1962).” Materials for the history of today's world. Akal editions.
• Van Dijk, R., Gray, WG, Savranskaya, S., Suri, J., & Zhai, Q. (eds.). (2013). “Cuban Missile Crisis.” Encyclopedia of the Cold War. Routledge.
• Wilczynski, J. (2019). “Cuban Missile Crisis.” In An encyclopedic dictionary of marxism, socialism and commune: Economic, Philosophical, Political and Sociological Theories, Concepts, Institutions and Practices-Classical and Modern, East-West Relations Included. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co Kg.